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We compare the behavior of voters, depending on whether they operate under sequential
and simultaneous voting rules, when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In
many real political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting
is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a styl-
ized model, we characterize the equilibria for this rule, and compare it to simultaneous
voting, and show how these equilibria vary for di⁄erent voting costs. This generates a
variety of predictions about the relative e¢ ciency and equity of these two systems, which
we test using controlled laboratory experiments. Most of the qualitative predictions are
supported by the data, but there are signi￿cant departures from the predicted equilib-
rium strategies, in both the sequential and sumultanous voting games. We ￿nd a tradeo⁄
between information aggregation, e¢ ciency, and equity in sequential voting: a sequential
voting rule aggregates information better, and produces more e¢ cient outcomes on aver-
age, compared to simultaneous voting, but sequential voting leads to signi￿cant inequities,
with later voters ben￿tting at the expense of early voters.I Introduction
I.1 Strategy, E¢ ciency, and Equity
In 2000 the polls closed in the eastern time zone portion of Florida at 7:00 p.m. At 7:49:40
p.m., while Florida voters in central time zone counties were still voting, NBC/MSNBC
projected that the state was in Al Gore￿ s column. A few seconds later CBS and FOX
also declared the state for Gore. At 8:02 p.m. eastern time, three hours before polls
closed in western states, ABC anchor Peter Jennings announced that his network was
going to call the state of Florida for Al Gore. Jennings remarked: ￿Give him [Gore] the
￿rst big state momentum of the evening. This is the biggest state where the race has been
close, the fourth biggest electoral prize.￿ 1 According to a study by Kathleen Frankovic
commissioned by CBS to analyze its election night reporting: ￿More than 60 percent of
the country￿ s 538 electoral votes are cast by states whose polls close by 8:00 PM, EST, a
full three hours before polls close in the West. More than 80 percent are cast by states
whose polls close by 9:00 PM, EST.￿ 2 It is no surprise then that Frankovic reports that
￿since at least 1965, losing candidates and Americans in general have assumed that the
networks have a⁄ected voting behavior by calling elections.￿
Most of the concerns raised after the early election calls in 2000 were about the prob-
lems of inaccuracy; and similar issues were raised about the reporting of the exit poll
results in 2004 when they showed early leads for Kerry.3 As observed by Thompson
(2004), however, even accurate reports of early voting outcomes during an election may
mean that the election is fundamentally di⁄erent from one held where voters participate
simultaneously in at least three ways. First, when voters participate sequentially and
early results are revealed to later voters, the choices facing the voters are complex as later
voters use early voting as a noisy information source and early voters try to anticipate
the message their votes can send to later voters and how later voters will react to that
message. These choices are even more complicated if voting is a costly act, requiring an
1Alicia C. Shepard, ￿How They Blew It,￿American Journalism Review, January/February 2001. Page
20.
2Frankovic, Kathleen, "Part Three: Historical Perspective," in Linda Mason, Kathleen Frankovic,
and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, CBS News Coverage of Election Night 2000: Investigation, Analysis,
Recommendations, January 2001.
3On the afternoon of election day 2004, ￿web sites such as slate.com, drugereport.com and dailykos.com
... were posting excerpts from early exit-poll reports ... Those postings were then e-mailed around,
meaning that potentially millions of people were getting at least glimpses of the information.￿ Fox News
anchor Brit Humes announced that exit poll rumors on the internet suggested that things looked ￿brighter
on the Kerry side than the Bush side.￿ The stock market plunged nearly 100 points. See Mark Memmott
and Martha T. Moore, Networks Stay Cautious But Hint At Outcome, USA Today, November 3, 2004
and Richard Morin, ￿Surveying the Damage; Exit Polls Can￿ t Predict Winners, So Don￿ t Expect Them
To,￿Washington Post, November 21, 2004.
1investment of time and resources, such that some voters may choose to abstain. Thomp-
son argues ￿an election that enables citizens to adjust their votes in this way [according
to how others have voted] privileges strategic voting￿and the value of a vote would then
depend on the ￿strategic savvy￿of the voter.
Second, if voters￿behavior does depend on the voting mechanism, then we might ex-
pect that sequential and simultaneous voting mechanisms will di⁄er in e¢ ciency. Simul-
taneous voting can be more informationally e¢ cient than sequential voting if in sequential
voting later voters are less inclined to participate or vote to ￿follow the crowd￿rather
than their independent judgements as Thompson suggests. On the other hand, sequential
voting might be more economically e¢ cient when voting is costly if the outcome of the
voting is equivalent but less voters are required to participate to achieve that outcome.
Finally, as Thompson points out sequential voting can be inequitable. He notes on (page
58): ￿simultaneity rests ... on the democratic value of fairness. If citizens vote at the
same time (or have only information they would have had if they were voting at the same
time), the value of each citizen￿ s choice is no greater than that of any other citizen.￿
In this paper we address these three concerns about sequential voting￿ strategic be-
havior, e¢ ciency, and equity￿ both theoretically and experimentally. Before we turn to
our analyses, however, we establish that sequential voting and the concerns about the
e⁄ect of sequence exist in many voting contexts￿ not just election night reporting￿ and we
review the related literature.
I.2 Prevalence of Sequential Voting Mechanisms
Election reporting of early voters￿choices during national elections in the U.S. is just
one example of the many voting situations in which participants choose in a sequential
order and individual choices are publicly revealed as they are made. The term ￿roll call
vote￿refers to the mechanism of calling for individuals￿votes as their names are called as
listed on a roll and is used in many voting contexts from city council meetings to national
legislatures (although the advent of electronic voting systems has reduced the sequential
nature of voting in large legislatures).
As with election night reporting, the sequential nature of roll call voting sometimes has
controversial implications. It is standard procedure in roll calls that the head of the body
votes last, under the assumption that otherwise the head would have an undue in￿ uence
on the outcome of the voting. Voting order is frequently debated in such bodies and in
some cases manipulated in order to a⁄ect the outcome or to advantage particular members
by changing their voting positions. For instance, the Syracuse New York Post-Standard
reported December 21, 2004 that a member of the Auburn, New York city council was
2considering a measure to require the mayor to vote ￿rst. The mayor argued: ￿They
want to see where I￿ m going to vote.￿One of the explanations for the expansion of the
use of electronic voting machines in such bodies is a desire to make voting simultaneous.
The New Orleans Times-Picayune reported on January 12, 1995 that the eleven member
St. Bernard Parish School Board was considering buying an electronic voting machine so
that individuals could vote simultaneously instead of the alphabetical order they normally
followed. A board member who wanted the machine argued that it would save time and
show ￿a true picture of what people think.￿ As a less costly alternative that would lessen
the supposed advantage of those with names at the end of the alphabet, Board member
Don Campbell advocated a rotating voting order: ￿When I ￿rst got on the board, it was
a little uncomfortable for me. ... I want everyone to have the opportunity to vote ￿rst.￿ 4
Another type of controversial sequential voting occurs in U.S. presidential primaries,
where voters participate by state and the outcome is the result of the cumulative choices.
As discussed in Morton and Williams (2000) many believe that the sequential nature of the
primaries gives voters in early states like New Hampshire and Iowa an undue in￿ uence on
the outcome through their in￿ uence on later voters￿choices. A similar voting mechanism
is used when countries hold sequential referenda over treaties or agreements as in the
recent referenda over the proposed European Union Constitution. The order in which
countries vote is often argued to have an e⁄ect on the voting in countries who choose
later in the sequence and attempts are made to manipulate that order. For example, in
1994, when Sweden scheduled its vote on joining the European Union for November, the
Financial Times of London reported [March 19, 1994]: ￿The Swedish decision almost
certainly ensures that the order of voting in the three Nordic neighbors will be Finland in
September, followed by Sweden, and then Norway ... With support for EU membership
among the Nordic countries strongest in Finland and weakest in Norway, the east to west
sequence has long been regarded as the best way to win a ￿ yes￿vote in the three nations.￿
Even more signi￿cantly, a growing percentage of voters are choosing before election day
either by mail or in early voting locations.5 In Oregon all elections are conducted by mail
over a period of weeks. The Annenberg Election Survey at the University of Pennsylvania
completed the week before the 2004 election found that 14 percent of registered voters
had already voted compared to 11 percent who at the same point had reported voting
early in 2000.6 Over 22 percent of the respondents to the National Election Studies
4While electronic voting machines might appear at face value to reduce the strategic issues of timing
in roll call votes, evidence suggest that legislators continue to engage in strategic tactics by delaying their
vote, as found in Glazer, Gri¢ n, Grofman, and Wattenberg￿ s (1995) study of Congressional vote delay.
5Thompson suggests that the use of sequential voting in legislatures and presidential primaries is not
problematic.
6Les Kjos, ￿Analysis: Early Voting Keeps Booming,￿United Press International, November 1, 2004.
3post 2004 survey reported voting before election day, with over 73 percent of the early
voters reporting voting more than a week before election day. Although the information
about how early voters choose is assumed to be secret, polls and other surveys are used to
estimate these choices making it possible for later voters (or those who mobilize them) to
know how early voters chose prior to making their own choices. As it is possible to gather
the names of early voters from local and state election o¢ cials￿ campaign managers can
then easily estimate based on demographics and poll results early voters￿choices.7
I.3 Related Literature
Although these sequential voting mechanisms are widespread and commonly debated,
most formal models of binary-issue voting under incomplete information assume simul-
taneous voting even when analyzing sequential voting situations. Such an approach has
seemed justi￿ed by preliminary formal analysis: Dekel and Piccione (2000) show that
any symmetric equilibria in simultaneous voting is also an equilibrium in the equivalent
sequential voting game; Wit (1997) and Fey (1998) argue that the beliefs necessary for
￿follow the crowd￿or cascade behavior conjectured by Thompson and others are not rea-
sonable. That is, for a cascade to occur a voter must believe that subsequent voters will
ignore their choices and therefore they will be indi⁄erent between following the crowd or
choosing what the voter believes is the best option when these con￿ ict. As stressed by
this literature, one important implication of these results is that the desirable properties
of information aggregation in simultaneous elections proven by Feddersen and Pesendorfer
[1997] extend to sequential elections and are independent of the order of moves.
As shown by Battaglini (2005), however, these result are sensitive to apparently in-
nocuous assumptions: in more general environments in which voters may abstain and
there is an even arbitrarily small cost of voting, simultaneous and sequential voting mech-
anisms induce distinct equilibrium behavior. Though Battaglini (2005) presents some
preliminary results on e¢ ciency, the comparative study of the properties of alternative
voting mechanisms is still an open question. Furthermore, Callander (2004) shows that
sequential voting can lead to follow the crowd behavior if voters have a conformity bias.
7Various campaign managers report in informal communications that such information on who has
voted is available and used by campaigns prior to election day to estimate the current vote totals and
which voters have not participated. According to one campaign manager in Los Angeles during the
mayoral election campaign of 2005 his o¢ ce provided a series of blank CD￿ s to the Beverly Hills City
Clerk and each day she provided them with an updated CD with the latest information downloaded from
the city￿ s computer. In some cases availability of the information is required by law, for example under
the Pennsylvania Election Code, 25 P.S. §3146(c): ￿Not less than ￿ve days preceding the election, the
chief clerk shall prepare a list for each election district showing the names and post o¢ ce addresses of all
voting residents thereof to whom o¢ cial absentee ballots have been issued ... Upon written request, he
shall furnish a copy of such list to any candidate or party county chairman.￿
4Empirical research on the e⁄ect of sequential voting on voter behavior, both exper-
imental and nonexperimental, is also surprisingly sparse. Two experimental studies
consider sequential voting without abstention: Hung and Plott (2001) and Morton and
Williams (1999, 2000). These two studies provide somewhat con￿ icting conclusions about
the extent later voters use early voters￿choices to inform their decisions. Hung and Plott
investigate sequential voting with a particular concern for the ￿follow the crowd￿ be-
havior. When they included a treatment which induced preference for conformity with
monetary incentives, they observe such behavior, as in Callander￿ s model. Morton and
Williams ￿nd that in sequential voting later voters do sometimes use the information they
infer from earlier voting and that these later voters make more informed choices than in
simultaneous voting, supporting Thompson￿ s concerns about the unfairness of sequential
voting.
While roll call voting in Congress and other legislatures has been extensively studied,
we are aware of no studies of such voting that explicitly considers how sequence a⁄ects
members￿decisions. The only nonexperimental empirical research on sequential voting
of which we are aware has focused on the e⁄ect of early election calls such as in 2000
on later voter turnout [see for example Wol￿nger￿ s and Linquiti￿ s (1981) and Jackson￿ s
(1983) studies of the 1980 election]. Frankovic reviews the literature, including several
unpublished studies of the 2000 election. Despite the fact that some of the analyses,
like Jackson￿ s, ￿nd an e⁄ect, as Frankovic notes the studies either use surveys of voters
after the election where a number clearly have faulty memories (some respondents claim
to have heard network calls earlier than they were actually made) or the studies use
aggregate data on past elections to estimate voter preferences in the election studied to
infer an e⁄ect on voter behavior. She points out rightly the di¢ culty from drawing
conclusions based on the available data. She also questions the political motivations of
some of the recent studies of the 2000 election. She concludes, no doubt happily for CBS,
that ￿there is little evidence of any impact of calling an election before all the polls are
closed.￿ Yet she notes that paradoxically, ￿there is no doubt that the public perceives
this to be a serious problem. While the arguments claiming an e⁄ect often are politically
motivated, and the research does not support the claim, the public believes otherwise.￿
Is the American public crazy as Frankovic suggests? Or does knowing the results of early
voting a⁄ect later voters￿choices as the advocates of electronic voting for the St. Bernard
Parish School Board believe and Thompson argues?
The next section presents our model of simultaneous and sequential voting and our
theoretical predictions about the e⁄ect of sequence in voting. In section III we discuss our
experimental design and we examine the individual level data in Section IV. In section
V we discuss the e¢ ciency of sequential versus simultaneous voting. We consider the
5equity of voting order in section VI and section VII concludes.
II Theoretical Analysis
II.1 Voter Preferences and Information
We consider a game with a set N = f1;2;:::;ng of voters who decide by majority rule.
There are two alternatives A,B and two states of the world: in the ￿rst state A is optimal
and in the second state B is optimal. Without loss of generality, we label A the ￿rst
state and B the second. The voters have identical preferences represented by a utility
function u(x;￿) that depends on the state ￿ and the action x:
v(A;A) = v(B;B) = v
v(A;B) = v(B;A) = 0
where v > 0. State A has a prior probability ￿ = 1
2. The true state of the world
is unknown, but each voter receives an informative signal. We assume that signals of
di⁄erent agents are conditionally independent and all have the same precision. The signal
can take two values a;b with probability:
Pr(ajA) = p = Pr(bjB)
where p > 1
2.
Although we assume that voters have identical preferences and thus if fully informed
would agree on a common choice, we can think of the voters as having di⁄erent preferences
over policy goals as given by their signals, but at the same time having common ultimate
goals as in other models of elections such as Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001).
Battaglini (2005) shows that the distinctions we ￿nd between sequential and simultaneous
voting also exist when voters have private values.
II.2 Costly Voting and Why the Order of Voting Matters
There is an apparently natural reason why behavior should depend on the order of the
voting procedure: when voters can observe previous voters￿behavior, they can be in-
￿ uenced by previous choices which may signal private information. This behavior was
conjectured by Bikhchandani et al. [1992], Bartels [1988] and others, who saw an analogy
between sequential voting and models of information cascades. In a recent contribution,
however, Deckel and Piccione [2000] have questioned this reasoning. Their argument is
based on the observation that a rational voter would realize that he is in￿ uential only
6when pivotal. In this case, the expected bene￿t of voting for alternative A for a voter i
who votes at stage t after a history ht and an observed signal si = a can be represented
as:
U(si) = Pr(PIVi jht;si = a) ￿ v ￿
￿





where Pr(PIVi;ht;si) is the probability of being pivotal; and v ￿ Pr(AjPIVi;si) is the
expected utility obtained if A wins conditional on being pivotal and on a signal si.8 The
probability of being pivotal depends on the signal si observed by i and on the partic-
ular history of votes cast in the previous stages of the game, but the expected utility
is independent of ht: in the pivotal event, the agent ￿knows￿how all the others have
voted, not only those who choose in the previous stages. The voter decides how to
vote on the basis of (1): he votes A when it is positive, and votes B when negative.
Since Pr(PIVi jht;si = a)v is non negative, his choice will be determined by the sign
of
￿
Pr(AjPIVi;si = a) ￿ 1
2
￿
: which implies that his choice will be independent of the
history, and informational cascades can not occur.
Though logically impeccable, this argument runs against the common perception that
the order of voting matters for the outcome. So why should we expect that sequential
voting mechanisms are di⁄erent from simultaneous ones?9
An explanation is provided in Battaglini [2005]. When there is a cost of voting c and
the agent can abstain, the decision depends on the sign of:
Pr(PIVi jht;si = a)
￿





In this case the decision is determined by the magnitude of Pr(PIVi jht;si), which depends
on ht. We should therefore expect to see rates of abstention that depend on the history,
and that increase as the probability of being pivotal decreases. This strategic abstention
phenomenon also suggests that the set of equilibria and the informational properties of
the two elections will also di⁄er: the set of equilibria are disjoint and simultaneous voting
should be superior when the size of the election is large enough.10
8In particular v ￿
￿
Pr(AjPIVi;si = a) ￿ 1
2
￿
is the net bene￿t of voting. Assume that if the agent
does not vote then there is a tie. If the agent votes he obtains v with probability Pr(AjPIVi;si = a)
(i.e., the posterior that the state is A given the fact that he is pivotal and he has observed an a signal),
and if he does not vote there is a tie and the policy is correct with probability 1
2. As it can be easily
veri￿ed, the case in which if the agent does not vote alternative B wins and if he votes A there is a tie is
equivalent.
9Using a di⁄erent approach, Gerardi and Yariv (2005) show that a very wide class of voting procedures,
including both sequential and simultaneous methods, yield the same set of equilibrium outcomes if voting
is preceded by a deliberation stage where the voters can communicate costlessly with each other. This
neutrality result does not hold if either deliberation OR voting is costly.
10Callander (2004) suggests that the di⁄erences between simultaneous and sequential elections can be
7In an election this cost straightforwardly represents the cost of the physical time and
e⁄ort of voting and can also be interpreted as the cost of mobilizing a group of voters to
participate. In a legislative situation the cost can be interpreted as the opportunity cost
of engaging in other legislative activities￿ the cost of leaving a meeting of a committee,
constituents, or executive o¢ cials to cast a ballot in a roll call vote. Legislators are often
aware of the progress of voting on contested matters while engaging in other activities
and can and do choose whether to return to the chamber. The cost could also be
interpreted as a cost of position taking if we assume that these costs are independent of
the position taken or the outcome of the voting; that is legislators may see it as desirable
to not take any positions on issues. A number of researchers have found evidence that
members of Congress, both House and Senate, avoid voting either because of the demands
of campaigning or a desire to not to take a policy position [see Thomas (1991), Rothenberg
and Sanders (1999, 2000), and Jones (2003)].11 News accounts complaining of excessive
abstention in city councils and other legislative bodies and mandatory rules requiring that
members only abstain if they have a con￿ ict of interest also suggests that these members
see the act of voting itself as costly.12
explained with behavioral assumptions on voters. He assumes that voters prefer to vote for winners, so
their decision would depend on the voting history. Such a voter would vote for a winning candidate even
if he or she is not pivotal.
11These studies examine the abstention or position avoidance by members of Congress over a number
of bills. Cohen and Noll (1991) present a case study of Congressional abstention on a series of bills on a
single issue and Poole and Rosenthal (1997) analyze aggregate abstention rates as a function of overall
legislative ideological preferences.
12For example, the Los Angeles Times reported on August 28, 2005 that the Foundation for Taxpayer
and Consumer Rights in Santa Monica has become so alarmed at rising abstention rates in the California
legislature (according to a study by public policy students at University of Southern California found
that the average abstention rate for Democrats in the California Assemby was 32% of Democrats and
13.5% of Republicans) it has drafted a ballot initiative that would withhold the pay of lawmakers on
days when they don￿ t vote. An editorial in the San Francisco Chronicle on June 25, 2002 complained
about ￿an outbreak of spinelessness￿in the California Assembly and argued: ￿Members ... are elected
to make tough choices and to serve their constituents. And they are elected to vote, as de￿ned by
￿ yes￿and ￿ no.￿ Too many ... are not doing their job.￿ Similarly, a December 14, 2004 editorial in the
Birmingham, Alabama News complained that too many city council members were abstaining on roll calls.
An alternative argument may be that legislators￿￿nd only incorrect positions costly. However, if this was
the case we would expect last voters, who tend to be the chairs or heads of the voting bodies, abstaining
less than earlier voters since they may be able to update from earlier voting about the ￿correctness￿
of a position. Casual observation suggests that this is not the case. Complainants about abstention
in the California Assembly have argued that the increase is related to the use of term limits and that
legislators are uncertain about the e⁄ect voting records may have on their future prospects independent
of the positions that are optimal at the time of voting so ￿nd taking any position on an issue costly. One
of the reasons why a member of the Auburn City Council of New York wished to changed the rule such
that the mayor voted ￿rst (discussed in the introduction) was because the mayor had abstained more
often than other voters. The councilor argued that the mayor was not doing his job: ￿I￿ m doing it to
ask him to take a leadership role. He￿ s abstained and said no when it￿ s meaningless.￿ The Birmingham
news report cited above singled out the Council President for abstaining 37 times in 2004.
8With costly voting, the net utility function of a voter who votes is therefore:
u(x;￿) ￿ c
in state ￿ if option x is chosen. We assume that a voter who decides alone would always
prefer to pay the cost and determine the outcome of the election: so c < 1
2 (2p ￿ 1)v,
where 1
2 (2p ￿ 1)v is the expected utility of voting for A (B) conditional on a a (b) signal.
It is therefore convenient to re-parametrize the cost as c =
￿
2(2p ￿ 1), where ￿ 2 (0;1).
II.3 The Voting Games
We will consider two game forms, which we call the simultaneous voting game and the
sequential voting game. In both games the outcome is chosen by majority rule and we
assume that when A receives the same votes as B, or when all voters abstain, then one
of the two alternatives is chosen with probability 1=2.
II.3.1 Strategies
In the simultaneous voting game all voters vote simultaneously. In this case, a (pure)
voting strategy for voter i is a map vi : fa;bg ! [A;B;￿]: i.e., given the signal, the
voter may vote for A, B or abstain. A mixed strategy assigns a probability of abstaining
￿i(￿;si), and, conditional on voting a probability of voting for each alternative, ￿i(x;si),
x = A;B. In the simultaneous game we focus on strategies that are not weakly dominated
and assume without loss of generality that ￿i(A;a) = ￿i(B;b) = 1.
In the second game form voters vote sequentially. In this case, a strategy is a function
vi : Hi￿fa;bg ! [A;B;￿] where Hi is the set of histories that voter i can observe. In this
case too we will denote ￿i(￿;si;hi) the probability that voter i abstains after observing
a signal si and a strategy hi; and ￿i(x;si;hi) the respective probability of voting for x,
conditional on not abstaining.
II.3.2 Equilibrium
An equilibriumof the sequential game (resp. simultaneous game) is symmetric if ￿i(￿;s;ht) =
￿j(￿;s;ht) for all i,j and all ht 2 Ht, and ￿ 2 fa;b; / ￿g, s 2 fa;bg (resp. if ￿i(￿;s) =
￿j(￿;s) for all i,j and for ￿ 2 fa;b; / ￿g, s 2 fa;bg). In this symmetric environment there
is no a priori di⁄erence between state A and B: it is therefore natural to assume that
the names associated with these two states are irrelevant for the strategic considerations
of the agents. Let us de￿ne Na(ht) (Nb(ht)) the number of a (b) votes in a history ht;
and let H0
t = fht s.t. Na(ht) = Nb(ht)g. After any of these histories the states continue
to be symmetric. We de￿ne an equilibrium of the sequential game (resp. simultaneous
9game) to be neutral if two requirements are satis￿ed: i) ￿i(￿;a;ht) = ￿i(￿;b;ht) for any
ht 2 H0
t (resp. ￿i(￿;a) = ￿i(￿;b)); and ii) Pr(￿jht) = Pr(￿jht+1) for any ht 2 H0
t ,
ht+1 = fht;￿g, and ￿ = A;B.13 Neutrality, therefore requires that if there is no reason
imposed by how previous voters have voted to treat the alternatives in a asymmetric
way, then their names should be irrelevant for the decision to vote or abstain. In our
experiments we ￿nd that no signi￿cant relationship between voters￿choices and the labels
of the alternatives.14 In the rest of the analysis we focus on symmetric, neutral perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies; for simplicity we will refer to such
an equilibrium as ￿an equilibrium.￿
II.4 Equilibrium Characterization
In order to test the theory that when voting is costly sequential and simultaneous voting
mechanisms lead to di⁄erences in voting behavior and outcomes because of strategic
abstention, we ￿rst characterize the equilibria. A di¢ culty with analyzing sequential
voting models is that as the number of agents increases the set of equilibria can expand.
If we want to test rational behavior, however, we need an environment in which the
predictions of the model can be pinned down. To this goal we specialize the model
presented in the previous section by assuming that there are only three voters. Therefore,
the model may be seen by some as more applicable to legislative roll call settings than
to large elections. However, our model can also be thought of as sequential voting in
elections where large groups of voters with correlated signals vote sequentially. As we
show in the next two sections, under natural conditions, the voting mechanisms generate
unique predictions that easily separate behavior in simultaneous and sequential voting
procedures.
II.4.1 Simultaneous Voting
The characterization of equilibria in the simultaneous game is simpli￿ed by two obser-
vations. First, in any Nash equilibrium with undominated strategies voters never vote
13Clearly the second requirement is not implied by the ￿rst only out of equilibrium.
14It is worth pointing out that non-neutral equilibria exist for some voting costs. Consider the case
where voting costs are very low and there are three voters. Then there is an equilibrium where voter 1
abstains with an a signal, but votes for B with a b signal. Voter 2 abstains with an a signal if and only
if voter 1 abstained, and abstains with a b signal if an only if voter 1 voted B. Voter 3 votes to break
ties, voting for A (regardless of signal) to break a 0 ￿ 0 tie and voting sincerely in a 1 ￿ 1 tie. Voter 3
also votes for A with an a signal if the ￿rst voter abstained and the second voter voted for B. We see no
evidence of this kind of behavior in our experiment. Reaching such an equilibrium would require some
form of pre-play coordination, so that it is common knowledge among all three voters that an abstention
by voter 1 implies an a signal. As an illustration, Example 1 in the Appendix constructs a non-neutral
perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
10against their signal; they either vote sincerely or abstain: therefore, to characterize the
equilibrium we only need to determine the abstention probabilities, f￿i(￿;si)g
3
i=1. Sec-
ond, neutrality implies that ￿i(￿;a) = ￿i(￿;b) = ￿i(￿), and symmetry implies ￿i(￿) =
￿j(￿) = ￿(￿) for all i,j. Therefore we can focus on one variable only: ￿(￿), and we drop
the dependence on ￿, simply writing it as ￿.
The equilibrium value of ￿ is determined by the cost of voting c and the equilibrium
expected bene￿t of voting, which is balanced againt the expected utility of not voting, so
the usual cost bene￿t calculus applies by conditioning on pivotal events. Consider voter
i with a signal si = a. His vote is pivotal only in three events. First, when no other
voter participates, event P0. This event occurs with probability ￿2; and, in this event,
the expected bene￿t of voting for A is equal to pv and the expected bene￿t of not voting
is simply 1
2. Hence the expected gain from voting in event P0 equals 1
2 (2p ￿ 1)v, where p
is the posterior probability of state A after one signal a. Second, a voter is pivotal when
exactly one other player votes, and this player voters B, event P1: In this case, however,
the posterior is 1
2 because in P1 there are exactly two opposite signal which o⁄set on the
other, so the expected gain from voting is 1
2 ￿ 1
2 = 0. The third possibility, is when
the two other voters vote, and they vote for opposite alternatives, event P2. In this case,





2p2(1 ￿ p) + 1
2p(1 ￿ p)2 = p
and the expected bene￿t of voting is, again, 1
2 (2p ￿ 1)v. From the point of view of i, this
event occurs with probability: Pr(P2 ja) = 2(1 ￿ ￿)
2 p(1 ￿ p). The expected utility of
voting for A for agent i is therefore:






2 + 2(1 ￿ ￿)
2 p(1 ￿ p)
￿
(2)
Comparing with the cost of voting we have a pure strategy equilibrium in which all agents
vote when (2p ￿ 1)p(1 ￿ p)v ￿ c; we have a mixed equilibrium at any value of ￿ 2 (0;1)
such that:
EU(￿) = c
The equilibrium conditions can be easily seen from Figure 1, which represents the right
hand side of (2) when p = 0:75 and v = 40, which are the parameters we use in the
experiment. When c is above 1
2(2p ￿ 1)v there is only a pure strategy equilibrium,
￿￿ = 1 with all voters abstaining. When c is between p(1 ￿ p)(2p ￿ 1)v (= 3:75) and
1
2(2p ￿ 1)v there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium that is increasing in c; when c

















Figure 1: Symmetric Equilibria in the Simultaneous Game
p(1￿p)
1+2p(1￿p) (2p ￿ 1)v = 2:7273), then we can have only a pure strategy equilibrium in which
￿￿ = 0. When c is between and
p(1￿p)
1+2p(1￿p)(2p ￿ 1)v and p(1 ￿ p)(2p ￿ 1)v, then there
are three equilibria: the pure strategy equilibrium ￿￿ = 0 and two mixed equilibria. We
can summarize these results in the following proposition which characterizes the set of
symmetric equilibria in the simultaneous game.
Proposition 1 When there are three voters:






there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium ￿￿ = 0.
ii. If c 2
h
p(1￿p)(2p￿1)
1+2p(1￿p) v;p(1 ￿ p)(2p ￿ 1)v
i
there are three equilibria: one pure strategy
equilibrium ￿￿ = 0; and two mixed strategy equilibria.
iii. If c 2 p(1 ￿ p)(2p ￿ 1)v; 1
2(2p ￿ 1)v), there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium
￿￿ 2 (0;1)
iv. If c ￿ 1
2(2p ￿ 1)v, there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium ￿￿ = 1
II.5 Sequential Voting
In a sequential game the action of an agent a⁄ects the outcome in two ways. First, we
have a direct e⁄ect: given the vote of the others, a vote in favor of an option increases its
plurality. But the vote of early voters has an indirect in￿ uence on later voters as well:
the vote signals the voter￿ s information to the remaining voters. This allows information
to be leaked in a way that is not possible with simultaneous voting, and this leakage may
12lead to e¢ ciency gains since later voters will rationally (and e¢ ciently) abstain after some
sequences of decisions by earlier voters.
We focus on sincere equilibria in which no voter votes against his own signals. While
there can exist equilibria where early voters vote against their signals, they are intuitively
implausible, ine¢ cient, and not observed in our experiments.15 At least one sincere equi-
librium always exists, and it is unique in the three-voter case we are considering here.
The following proposition summarizes the unique path of equlibrium play as a function
of the voting cost, and informativeness of the signal.
Proposition 2 When there are three voters there exists a unique sincere, neutral equilib-
rium path, for all voting costs, and this equilibrium is in pure strategies. The equilibrium
path is as follows:
i. if c 2
￿
p(1 ￿ p)(2p ￿ 1)v; 1
2(2p ￿ 1)v
￿
, the ￿rst two voters abstain and the third voter
votes (sincerely);
ii. If c 2 [0;p(1 ￿ p)2p ￿ 1)v], the ￿rst voter votes (sincerely), the second voter votes
only if the ￿rst voter has voted and he has a di⁄erent signal than the ￿rst voter; and
the last voter only if the ￿rst two voters vote for opposite alternatives or if no voter
votes before. All voters vote informatively when they vote.
O⁄ the equilibrium path behavior is a bit more complicated. Table 1 below shows
equilibrium strategies at all information sets in which the voter received an a signal
including the o⁄the equilibrium path strategies that support these two equilibria.16 Case
i is referred to as ￿high cost￿and case ii is ￿low cost.￿Notice that the only di⁄erence
between the two equilibria is whether the ￿rst voter abstains or votes. The equilibrium
15Insincere equilibria may exist, as shown in Example 2 in the appendix.
16Equilibrium strategies following b signals are analogous.
13behavior strategies at all other nodes remain the same.
Table 1. Equilibrium Abtension Rates
Sequential Voting Game
Information Set Equilibrium Strategy
Voter History High Cost Low Cost
1 1 0
2 Abstain 1 1
2 A 1 1
2 B 0 0
3 Abstain, Abstain 0 0
3 Abstain, A 1 1
3 Abstain, B 1 1
3 A, Abstain 1 1
3 B, Abstain 1 1
3 A,A 1 1
3 B,B 1 1
3 B,A 0 0
3 A,B. 0 0
Simultaneous Voting Game
Symmetric Equilibrium .89 0
II.6 Theoretical Implications for E¢ ciency and Equity
Propositions 1 and 2 present a clear characterization of the equilibria. When c <
p(1￿p)(2p￿1)v
1+2p(1￿p) and c > p(1 ￿ p)(2p ￿ 1)v, we have a unique equilibrium in the simultaneous
and in the sequential models and these equilibria are di⁄erent. In particular:
￿ When c > p(1￿p)(2p￿1)v there is a unique equilibrium of the simultaneous game
in which the voters obtain with probability ￿￿1(c) 2 (0;1) and vote informatively
with the complementary probability. In the sequential game there is a unique
equilibrium in pure strategies in which only the last voter votes in equilibrium, as
described in point i: of Proposition 2.
￿ When c <
p(1￿p)(2p￿1)v
1+2p(1￿p) there is a unique equilibrium of the simultaneous game in
which the voters vote informatively and never abstain. In the sequential game there
is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies as described in point ii. of Proposition 2.
In the rest of the paper we focus on parameters only in these two regions to avoid
multiplicity of equilibria. We refer to the ￿rst case as the high cost case and to the second
case as the low cost case.17 Given this, we should expect very di⁄erent behavior between
17See Section II.4 for the speci￿c parameters chosen in the experimental design.
14simultaneous and sequential elections, and given the voting mechanism between high and
low costs. In particular:
￿ In simultaneous elections, we should expect the probability of abstention to be
decreasing in the cost of voting: the probability should be positive in the high cost
region and zero in the low cost region.
￿ Sequential elections with high costs should be characterized by free riding from early
voters who should abstain counting on the participation of late votes. In sequential
elections with low costs the opposite should occur: the ￿rst voter should always
vote and late voters should vote only if they ￿nd it optimal to correct the choice of
earlier voters and if they are pivotal.
These di⁄erence have an impact on the theoretical e¢ ciency and equity properties of
the voting mechanisms as well as noted in the Introduction. With respect to equity,
in a symmetric equilibrium all voters obtain the same expected utility, in the sequential
mechanism expected utility depends on the stage in which the agent votes. When the cost
is high and the early voters free ride, late voters receive a lower utility level; in a low cost
regime, on the contrary, late voters bene￿t from the participation of early voters obtain
and higher expected utility. The predictions with respect to e¢ ciency will be discussed
in greater details in Section IV where we develop the appropriate benchmark case for
e¢ ciency: here we note that when the cost is low we should expect lower abstention than
with high voting costs: and, therefore, we should expect a more e¢ cient collective when
the cost of voting is low.
III Experimental Design
The experiments were all conducted at a major research university and used students
from that university. All the laboratory experiments used p = 0:75 and v = 40 cents.
We used two di⁄erent treatments for the cost of voting: c = 8 cents and c = 2 cents.
As noted above, these parameters allow us to have distinctive predictions about voter
behavior, e¢ ciency, and equity. Table 1 summarizes the predictions according to the
cost parameters. Six sessions were conducted, each with either 9 or 12 subjects.18 Each
subject participated in exactly one session. Each session was divided into two half-sessions,
each of which lasted for 20 rounds and the treatments were di⁄erent in the two sessions.
Table 2 summarizes all the sessions.
18Each session included one additional subject who was paid $20 to serve as a monitor.
15Table 2: Experimental Design
Session First 20 rounds Second 20 rounds #Subjects
1 High Cost Simultaneous Low Cost Sequential 9
2 Low Cost Simultaneous High Cost Sequential 12
3 Low Cost Sequential High Cost Simultaneous 12
4 High Cost Sequential Low Cost Simultaneous 12
5 High Cost Sequential Low Cost Sequential 12
6 Low Cost Sequential High Cost Sequential 12
Subjects were randomly divided into groups of three for each round and in the sequen-
tial voting treatments were randomly assigned within each new group voting positions
(￿rst, second, or third voter). Instructions were read aloud and subjects were required
to correctly answer all question on a short comprehension quiz before the experiment was
conducted. Subjects were also provided a summary sheet about the experiment which
they could consult. The experiments were conducted via computers.19 Subjects were
told there were two possible jars, Jar 1 and Jar 2. Jar 1 contained six red balls and two
blue; jar 2 contained six blue balls and two red. For each group, one of the jars was
randomly selected by the computer, with replacement. The balls were then shu› ed in
random order on the each subject￿ s computer screen, with the ball colors hidden. Each
subject then privately select one ball by clicking on it with the mouse and thereby reveal
its color to that subject only. The subject then chose whether to vote for the jar 1,
vote for jar 2, or abstain. If the majority of the votes cast by the group were for the
correct jar, each group member, regardless of whether he or she voted, received a payo⁄
of 50 cents (minus the cost of voting if they voted). If the majority of the votes cast
by the group were incorrect guesses, each group member, regardless of whether he or she
voted received, a payo⁄ of 10 cents (minus the cost of voting if they voted). Ties were
broken randomly. This was repeated for 40 rounds, with the group membership shu› ed
randomly after each round. Each subject was paid the sum of his or her earnings over all
40 rounds in cash at the end of the experiment. Average earnings were approximately
$25, with each session lasting about 90 minutes.
19The computer program used was similar to Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) for jury
decision making experiments without abstention, rewritten as an extension to the open source Multistage
game software. See http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu. The extension was developed by Christopher
Crabbe at the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS).
16IV Experimental Results
IV.1 Individual Choices: Does Sequence Matter?
IV.1.1 Simultaneous Voting Choices
Our theoretical analysis of simultaneous voting suggests that we should see zero abstention
in the low cost treatment and positive abstention in the high cost treatment. Table 3
summarizes the voting choices of participants in the simultaneous voting games. Of the
900 individual voting decisions in the simultaneous voting games, only 17 (<2%) were
votes against a subject￿ s signal and of these 11 were cast by two subjects in the low
cost treatment. We drop those cases from the analysis in this paper. Abstention was
signi￿cantly higher in the high cost treatment than in the low cost games (67.86 percent
compared to 38.96 percent).
Table 3: Voter Choices in Simultaneous Voting Games
Low Cost High Cost Total
Abstained :39 :68 :52
Voted Signal :58 :31 :46
Voted Contrary to Signal :029 :007 :019
Total Observations 480 420 900
Table 4 below presents a multinomial probit maximum pseudo likelihood estimation of
simultaneous voting choices by round and cost treatment. The standard errors have been
adjusted for correlation by subject.20 From Table 4 we calculate the e⁄ect of the di⁄erence
in cost and how this di⁄erence changes by round. Abstention increases by round, although
to a greater extent in the high cost treatments. A voter in the ￿rst round in the low
cost treatment is estimated to abstain with probability of 34 percent while a voter in the
￿rst round of the high cost treatment is estimated to abstain with a probability of 59
percent. In the 20th round of the low cost treatment a voter is estimated to abstain with
probability of 44 percent while the probability of the voter abstaining in the same round
in the high cost treatment is estimated at 74 percent. Although increasing abstention for
the high cost treatment might demonstrate learning, increasing abstention is contrary to
the prediction for the low cost treatment. Figure 2 below shows the relationship between
actual abstentions, predicted abstentions, and the probability of abstaining as estimated
from the multinomial probit by round and cost treatment.
20See Wooldridge (2002) pages 500-503 for a discussion of multinomial probit. Estimation in Stata 9
with observations clustered by subject.
17Table 4: Multinomial Probit of Simultaneous Voter Choices
Null Case Abstention in Low Cost 1st Round
(Std. Err. adjusted for 45 subject clusters, 900 observations)
Equation 1: Voting Signal
Variable Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>jzj
High Cost ￿0:93 0:47 ￿2:03 0:043
Round in Low Cost ￿0:02 0:01 ￿1:63 0:10
Round in High Cost ￿0:03 0:01 ￿1:92 0:055
Constant 0:51 0:32 1:61 0:11
Equation 2: Voting Contrary to Signal
High Cost ￿0:38 0:65 ￿0:59 0:56
Round in Low Cost ￿0:02 0:03 ￿0:75 0:45
Round in High Cost ￿0:20 0:02 ￿9:22 0
Constant ￿1:46 0:47 ￿3:12 0
Log Pseudolikelihood ￿649:90
Firgure 2: Probability of Abstaining in Sequential Voting
Quantal Response Equilibrium Predictions As is clear from Figure 2, we ￿nd
little support for the exact quantitative Nash equilibrium predictions in simultaneous
18voting: low cost voters abstain signi￿cantly more than predicted, and high cost voters
abstain signi￿cantly less than predicted. However the Nash solution assumes voters
behave perfectly rationally with no error. Given the complexity of the game they are
playing, such a strong assumption seems implausible. An alternative approach, following
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998), is to consider a statistical version of Nash equilibrium
in which we assume that for each actor all possible actions have a positive probability
but that the probabilities are ordered by the expected payo⁄s of the actions according
to a quantal response function, which is a statistical version of a best response function.
Of course, these responses will also be in￿ uenced by the probability distribution chosen
by the other players in the game and so on. A QRE is the ￿xed point of this iterative
process. To simplify computations, we consider QRE of only the simpli￿ed version of the
simultaneous voting game in which players choose either to vote sincerely or to abstain.
In order to provide parametric estimates, we use the logit speci￿cation of QRE, where
the quantal response functions are logit curves and ￿ is the response parameter. When
￿ = 0, the response curves are ￿ at and all strategies are used with equal probability,
or zero rationality. As ￿ approaches 1, the logit response curves converge to the best
response curves or perfect rationality. Thus, the Nash equilibrium predictions correspond
to a boundary case of the QRE model.
Table 5 presents our estimates of the logit QRE, computed using the voting decisions
of subjects in the simultaneous voting games. We estimated three values of ￿, one where
￿ is constrained to be equal across cost treatments and two unconstrained values of ￿
by cost treatment, ￿H and ￿L for high and low cost treatments respectively. We ￿nd
little change in the values of ￿H and ￿L over time, except for some apparent convergence
towards each other (and to the constrained value). For all rounds, using a likelihood
ratio test, the di⁄erence between ￿H and ￿L is not signi￿cant at the 5% level (the ￿2
statistic equals 2.9) and for the last ten rounds we ￿nd the di⁄erence not signi￿cant
at any conventional level (the ￿2 statistic equals 1.2). This ￿nding suggests that a
unique parameter can explain behavior of the subjects in seemingly remarkably di⁄erent
strategic environments since, as seen above, the equilibria are extremely di⁄erent in the
high and low cost treatments. Figure 3 presents the relationship between the probability
of abstaining and the equilibrium values of ￿ for both the low and high cost treatments
along with the estimated values for our treatments.
19Table 5: QRE Pooled Estimation: Simultaneous Game
Cost Abstention Rate ￿ Log Likelihood
Data QRE
High 0:68 0:68 0:25 263:74 Unconstrained
Low 0:39 0:39 0:49 320:91 Unconstrained
High 0:68 0:70 0:30 586:10 Constrained
Low 0:39 0:42 0:30 586:10 Constrained
Constrained model not rejected (p = :05)
Figure 3 here
IV.1.2 Sequential Voting Choices
In the sequential voting games we expect to ￿nd two types of strategic abstention:
￿ In the low cost treatment, we predict that later voters will strategically abstain
when they are not pivotal, voting sincerely otherwise.
￿ In the high cost treatment, we predict that early voters will strategically abstain,
leaving the choice for later voters. If early voters do vote, later voters will choose
sincerely if pivotal, otherwise they will strategically abstain.
As predicted, subjects￿choices in the sequential voting treatments depended not only
on the cost of voting but their position in the voting order and the choices made by
previous voters. Table 6 summarizes the aggregate abstention rates at all information
sets. We pool observations for voters with a and b signals. In the history column, "V"
indicates that a previous voter voted for the alternative consistent with the current voter￿ s
signal, and "N" indicates that a previous voter voted for the alternative inconsistent with
the current voter￿ s signal. Out of 1860 voting decisions, we observed only 27 (<1.5%)
cases where voters voted against their signal, and these were scattered randomly across the
information sets. We drop those cases from the analysis in this paper, and the abstention
rates are computed accordingly. We discuss the results of the table in the reverse order
of voting. This is also summarized in Figure 4 (the predicted strategies are highlighted in
bold), which combines several histories. For example, NV and VN histories are combined
20because the theory makes identical predictions.
Table 6. Abstention Rates in the Sequential game
Voter History Low Cost High Cost
Data Nash QRE # Obs Data Nash QRE # Obs
1 :34 0 :46 298 :47 1 :63 309
2 Abstain :39 1 :51 99 :51 1 :61 140
2 V :72 1 :55 128 :87 1 :70 105
2 N :41 0 :29 71 :69 0 :68 67
3 Abstain, Abstain :31 0 :19 39 :33 0 :44 72
3 Abstain, V :94 1 :59 34 :95 1 :72 37
3 Abstain, N :63 1 :59 27 :65 1 :72 34
3 V, Abstain :99 1 :59 79 :93 1 :72 82
3 N, Abstain :69 1 :72 42 :71 1 :74 55
3 V,V 1:00 1 :59 23 :88 1 :72 8
3 N,N 1:00 1 :59 12 1:00 1 :72 7
3 V,N :24 0 :19 17 :36 0 :44 14
3 N,V :32 0 :19 25 :56 0 :44 9
All Periods Periods 11-20 All Periods Periods 11-20
Lambda 0:19 0:16 0:13 0:16
Log Likelihood ￿582:41 ￿281:73 ￿593:15 ￿286:90
Constrained Lambda 0:15 0:16
Log Likelihood ￿1178:00 ￿578:63
Figure 4 here
Third Voters￿Choices We predict that third voters will strategically abstain if their
votes are not pivotal. Table 6 displays third voter choices for each history of the ￿rst two
voters and as a function of the third voter￿ s signal. As with simultaneous voters, only 4 out
of 620 voting choices were contrary to third voters￿signals. Thus we ￿nd essentially no
evidence of ￿follow the crowd￿behavior or information cascades, even when third voters
are not pivotal. Third voters are signi￿cantly more likely to abstain when it is clear
that their vote is irrelevant in both the high and low cost treatments￿ in 270 of the 283
cases (95.4%) where voting their signal would not have altered the outcome third voters
abstained. Although theory predicts well voting behavior in such cases, it performs less
well in predicting voter choices in situations where their votes are pivotal and we would
expect third voters to vote. That is, when both voters 1 and 2 abstain, third voters vote
only in 75 out of 111 cases (67.57%) and when voters 1 and 2 votes con￿ ict, third voters
vote only in 22 of 67 cases (67.16%).
21Second Voters￿Choices We make the following predictions about second voter be-
havior: In both the low and high cost treatments, we predict second voters to strategically
abstain if ￿rst voters voted their signals or if ￿rst voters abstained, and to vote sincerely
if ￿rst voters voted contrary to their signals.
The decisions of voter 2 in the sequential games is displayed in Table 6, broken down
by the decision of voter 1 and the signal of voter 2.
As above, we ￿nd few voters voting contrary to their own signals, ten out of 620
voting choices. In the low cost treatment, second voters abstain signi￿cantly more than
simultaneous voters [t statistic of 3.94] and ￿rst voters [t statistic = 5.04]. In the high
cost treatment, there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between simultaneous voters￿abstention
choices and second voters￿[t statistic = 0.73], but second voters do abstain signi￿cantly
more than ￿rst voters [t statistic = 5.27]. These results re￿ ect the fact that we ￿nd strong
evidence of strategic abstention when ￿rst voters vote second voter￿ s signals. When ￿rst
voters abstain, however, second voters in the low cost treatment are more likely to vote
than abstain while second voters in the high cost treatment are largely indi⁄erent between
voting and abstaining. When ￿rst voters vote contrary to the second voter￿ s signal, low
cost voters are more likely to vote than abstain, while high cost voters are more likely to
abstain than vote.21
Callander (2004) shows that if voters have comformist preferences, then in a three voter
game such as ours, if an information cascade occurs, second voters would vote contrary
to their signals when ￿rst voters￿choices are contrary to second voters￿signals. We ￿nd
little evidence of such behavior by second voters, suggesting that preference conformity,
to the extent that it may exist, is dwarfed by the cost of voting even in the low cost case.
Second voters are in fact less likely to vote contrary to their signals under such cases.
Second voters￿votes are the same as ￿rst voters￿votes only 20.32 percent of the time
and of those only 1.96 percent (1 lone observation) are cases where second voters voted
contrary to their signal.
First Voters￿Choices We predict that ￿rst voters will choose sincerely in the low
cost treatment and abstain in the high cost treatment. Table 6 summarizes the choices
of voter 1 in the sequential games by cost treatment, and provides a comparison to the
simultaneous move games.
21We also ￿nd, but do not report in the table, that second voters are more likely to abstain in both
high and low cost treatments in the later rounds.
22Table 7: First Voter Choices
Low Cost High Cost Total
Abstained :33 :45 :39
Voted Signal :67 :52 :59
Voted Contrary to Signal :007 :03 :02
Total Observations 300 320 620
High versus Low Cost Abs. t statistic = 2:99
Seq. versus Simul. in Low Cost t statistic = 1:6
Seq. versus Simul. in High Cost t statistic = 6:35
As above, few ￿rst voters voted contrary to their signal, only 13 out of 620 voting
choices. Also as with the voters in the simultaneous voting games, ￿rst voters abstained
signi￿cantly more in the high cost treatment than in the low cost treatment. However
￿rst voters in the sequential voting games are signi￿cantly less likely to abstain than
voters in the same simultaneous cost treatment, and this di⁄erence is highly signi￿cant in
the high cost treatment. Thus, while cost increases abstention, as predicted, ￿rst voters
in the high cost treatment abstain far less than theoretically predicted. Most ￿rst voters
do not strategically abstain in the high cost sessions (that is, pass the choice on to later
voters). We also ￿nd little evidence of changing abstention rates by ￿rst voters during the
experiment. A multinomial probit estimation similar to Table 4 with corrected standard
errors for subject clustering shows that round has an insigni￿cant e⁄ect on ￿rst voter
abstention rates.
QRE and Sequential Voting As with the simultaneous voting game, we also estimate
the QRE for the simpli￿ed sequential voting game (where voters either vote their signals
or abstain); the results from that estimation is presented in Table 6. As in the QRE
estimation of the simultaneous game, the assumption is that voters use a statistical version
of a best response function (a logit) and we solve for the ￿xed point of the sequential logit
QRE game. As above, ￿ is our measure of voter response, where higher values of ￿ imply
higher degrees of rationality. We report the estimate where ￿ is constrained to be the
same for both low and high cost sessions as in the simultaneous voting game analysis,
and also report the separate estimates. Figures 5a,b,c display the logit equilibrium
correspondences for the sequential game for both low and high cost treatments with
unconstrained values of ￿. Figure 5a displays the correspondences for player 1, Figure
5b for player 2, and Figure 5c for player 3. Note that in Figures 5b,c the equilibrium
correspondences depends on the voter￿ s information set. As in the simultaneous voting
analysis, we ￿nd a lack of signi￿cant di⁄erence between ￿H and ￿L, and an apparent
23convergence over time. For all rounds the likelihood ratio test the ￿2 statistic equals 4.88
which is barely signi￿cant, but for the last ten rounds the ￿2 statistic is less than 0.01.
As with the simultaneous game, this fact suggests that only one parameter estimate can
explain behavior in quite di⁄erent strategic environments. That is, just one parameter
explains behavior at di⁄erent nodes of the game in which subjects are in di⁄erent stages
of voting and information sets.
Figures 5a,b,c about here
Summary of Sequential Voting Choices As the analysis above shows we can con-
clude the following:
￿ We ￿nd weak evidence of strategic abstention by early voters. First voters do
abstain more under the high cost treatment, passing the choice on to later voters,
but abstain less than simultaneous voters facing the same cost. First voters respond
signi￿cantly to expected utility gains from voting.
￿ We ￿nd strong evidence of strategic abstention by later (third) voters when they are
not pivotal and second voters ￿passing￿on voting when ￿rst voters￿choices agree
with their signals.
￿ We ￿nd little evidence of ￿follow the crowd￿or information cascades. Second voters
either vote their signal or abstain if ￿rst voters vote contrary to second voters￿signals
and third voters abstain rather than vote when ￿rst and second voters￿choices
agree.
￿ We ￿nd that one parameter can explain voters￿choices.
V E¢ ciency of the Voting Mechanisms
V.1 Informational E¢ ciency: How Accurate are Decisions?
As noted in the Introduction, we distinguish two di⁄erent kinds of e¢ ciency, informational
and economic. First we consider the informational e¢ ciency of the simultaneous and
sequential voting games. Informational e¢ ciency is simply de￿ned as decision accuracy,
without consideration for the deadweight loss of voting costs. What fraction of the time
does the committee make the right decision?
To answer this question and allow comparison with a benchmark, we construct two in-
dices of accuracy. The ￿optimal￿voting mechanism from the standpoint of informational
24e¢ ciency is a full information mechanism, where all voters always vote their signal. For
the parameters of our experiment, the best the committee can do on average is to vote
correctly with ex ante probability 27
32 = :84. Conditional on the actual signal draws, the
best possible decision accuracies are (:96;:75) depending on whether three or two of the
committee member￿ s signals agreed with each other, respectively. Using this as a bench-
mark, we compute an empirical measure of decision accuracy (DA) for each treatment
and each combination of signals. The score, S, is simply the fraction of actual decisions
that match the decision that would have been made in the full information mechanism,
given the committee members￿actual signal draws.22
Table 8 below reports displays the fraction of actual decisions that were ties, the
fraction that were the same as the full information decision (the column labeled FI), and
the decision accuracy score, broken down by treatment and whether the committee has 2
agreeing signals or 3 agreeing signals.23
As one would expect, in cases where all three voters received the same signal as
compared to the cases where only two voters received the same signal, the group decision
was signi￿cantly more likely to coincide with full information, and there are fewer ties in
those cases. Also noteworthy is the frequency of ties, and how it varies with the voting
cost and the voting mechanism. Theoretically, the frequency of ties should be highest
in the simultaneous high cost, next highest in simultaneous low cost, and lowest in the
sequential treatments. This is exactly what happens.24 Table 9 presents comparisons of
informational e¢ ciency across treatments, by computing the di⁄erence in scores (￿DA).
In equilibrium, decision accuracy should decrease with the cost of voting, and should be
higher in the sequential mechanism than in the simultaneous mechanism. Indeed the signs
for all 15 comparisons are consistent with these equilibrium predictions, and 10 of these
di⁄erences are signi￿cant at p = .05 or less.
Summarizing, the three main ￿ndings about informational e¢ ciency are:
1. Increasing the cost of voting reduces informational e¢ ciency holding the type of
voting mechanism constant with the exception of the simultaneous voting games
where only two voters￿signals agreed.
2. Sequential voting is more informationally e¢ cient than simultaneous voting for both
high and low voting costs, but the di⁄erence is only signi￿cant when all three signals
22The optimal mechanism never has ties, but the data does. In fact, we observe a 0 ￿ 0 tie in ten
percent of the elections. In the data, we count each tie as "1=2 success" in computing the score.
23For the rest of the paper, we do not drop observations where subjects voted against their signals. If
we had dropped them, the e¢ ciency scores would be higher.
24In fact, theoretically there should be no ties in the sequential mechanism, where we observe them in
about one ￿ sixth of elections.
25agree.
3. The most informationally e¢ cient voting mechanism is the low cost sequential voting
game and the least informationally e¢ cient mechanism is the high cost simultaneous
game. The di⁄erence in e¢ ciency between the two is estimated to be 13 percent
across all cases, 17 percent when all three signals agree, and 12 percent when only
two signals agree.
Table 8: Decision Accuracy
Treatment Group Signals Ties FI DA
Simultaneous Low Cost All :24 :68 :80
3 Sigs. Agree :08 :90 :94
2 Sigs. Agree :33 :55 :71
Simultaneous High Cost All :34 :55 :73
3 Sigs. Agree :29 :68 :82
2 Sigs. Agree :38 :45 :64
Sequential Low Cost All :16 :77 :85
3 Sigs. Agree :02 :98 :99
2 Sigs. Agree :25 :64 :76
Sequential High Cost All :19 :68 :77
3 Sigs. Agree :10 :87 :92
2 Sigs. Agree :27 :53 :66
Table 9: Statistical Comparisons of Informational E¢ ciency
Cases Comparison Treatment Pair* ￿DA t statistic
All Cases Low Sim. > High Sim. :08 2:05
Low Seq. > High Seq. :08 3:03
Low Seq. > Low Sim. :05 1:7
High Seq. > High Sim. :05 1:44
Low Seq. > High Sim. :13 3:89
3 Sigs. Agree Low Sim. > High Sim. :12 2:86
Low Seq. > High Seq. :08 3:67
Low Seq. > Low Sim. :05 2:01
High Seq. > High Sim. :09 2:32
Low Seq. > High Sim. :17 4:8
2 Sigs. Agree Low Sim. > High Sim. :07 1:3
Low Seq. > High Seq. :09 2:41
Low Seq. > Low Sim. :05 1:09
High Seq. > High Sim. :02 0:49
Low Seq. > High Sim. :12 2:42
26V.2 Economic E¢ ciency
V.2.1 The Optimal Mechanism
In order to evaluate the economic e¢ ciency of the sequential and simultaneous voting
mechanisms it is useful to de￿ne a slightly di⁄erent optimal mechanism as a benchmark.
For informational e¢ ciency, since cost was not an issue, the e¢ cient mechanism was simply
the one that minimized the probability of a mistake, which we called FI. For economic
e¢ ciency, we use as a benchmark the outcomes that would result if all players played the
unique neutral equilibrium of the sequential voting game (which is always more e¢ cient
than the symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous game).25 In the low cost game, in
that equilibrium, the ￿rst voter votes informatively, the second voter votes only if he has
a signal di⁄erent from the ￿rst agent￿ s vote, and the last voter votes informatively (and
decides the outcome) only to break a tie. For high voting costs, this is not the correct
benchmark. Speci￿cally, as shown in Proposition 2, if c 2 [p(1 ￿ p)(2p ￿ 1)v;(p ￿ :5)v]
then the unique neutral equilibrium is for only the last voter to vote and the others to
abstain, for all signal pro￿les.26 We call the benchmark e¢ ciency E￿. Table 10 shows
the voting decisions and outcomes that result in this equilibrium for each of the eight
possible pro￿les of signals by the three committee members.
Table 10: E¢ cient Outcomes (E￿)
Low Cost High Cost
Signals Votes Outcome Votes Outcome
Voter # Voter # Voter #
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
a a a A ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿ A A
a a b A ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿ B B
a b a A B A A ￿ ￿ A A
a b b A B B B ￿ ￿ B B
b a a B A A A ￿ ￿ A A
b a b B A B B ￿ ￿ B B
b b a B ￿ ￿ B ￿ ￿ A A
b b b B ￿ ￿ B ￿ ￿ B B
Note that in the low cost treatment these outcomes are informationally e¢ cient, that is
the decision always coincides with the full information decision. Furthermore, it minimizes
the expected number of votes required to do so in a sequential voting game, since voters
2 and 3 only have to vote half the time, that is, they vote if and only if voter 1 and voter
2 received di⁄erent signals.27
25The choice of a benchmark does not a⁄ect our results. Other benchmarks yield similar conclusions.
26If c > (p ￿ :5)v then it is e¢ cient (and an equilibrium) for everyone to abstain.
27Non-neutral equilibria can do better, as demonstrated by the equilibrium constructed in Example 1.
27Several other features of the e¢ cient benchmark for our experimental parameters are
worth noting. First, for low costs, the outcome can never be achieved as an equilibrium
of the simultaneous voting game, even if we were to allow for asymmetric equilibria of the
simultaneous game. The reason is that voter 2￿ s voting decision is conditional on voter 1￿ s
decision. The simultaneous mechanism can be optimal for higher costs. If costs are very
high (> pv￿:5 in our setting) then the e¢ cient mechanism is just random, with no voting
at all. For slightly lower costs, it is e¢ cient to always have exactly one voter for every
pro￿le, in which case the asymmetric equilibria of the simultaneous game produce e¢ cient
outcomes for some costs. However, in these cost ranges, there is always an equilibrium of
the sequential move game that achieves the e¢ cient outcome. In this sense, the sequential
mechanism dominates the simultaneous mechanism over all cost ranges. If asymmetric
equilibria are ruled out, this domination is strict, except in the very high cost range where
nobody ever votes.
Second, the outcome could never arise from a two stage voting game, because voter
3￿ s voting decision is contingent on both voter 1 and voter 2￿ s decisions. Finally, notice
that the e¢ cient benchmark does not have ties. There is an odd number of votes cast for
every signal pro￿le. We conjecture that this is a property of e¢ cient mechanisms, more
generally.
V.2.2 Empirical Economic E¢ ciency
As a measure of economic e¢ ciency we compare the average group payo⁄s of voters with
the payo⁄s they would receive under the e¢ ciency benchmark E￿. In order to compare
the realized payo⁄s with the e¢ cient payo⁄s we calculate the expected group payo⁄s
given the realized signals and group voting choice. Note that these are the expected
payo⁄s before the realization of the state A or B so that any randomness in the state,
conditional on signal draws, that might bene￿t a particular treatment does not a⁄ect our
comparisons. When we calculate the group optimal bene￿ts for comparisons, we use the
expected weight across all sequences of signal draws rather than the realized voting order
e⁄ects in the sequential voting treatments so that our comparisons can be made across
voting mechanisms. We also normalize bene￿ts relative to a natural lower bound, given
by the random mechanism, which is correct 50% of the time and is costless. The expected
bene￿ts reported in the E(B) column is equal to the realized experimental payo⁄s minus
the expected payo⁄s under the random mechanism. Finally, as with informational e¢ -
ciency, we report the e¢ ciency measure for the two di⁄erent signal con￿gurations (3 agree
and 2 agree). Table 11 presents a summary of the expected group payo⁄s as compared to
the e¢ cient group payo⁄s. The last column reports a simple measure of e¢ ciency, which
28is the ratio (rE￿) of the actual net bene￿t to the optimal net bene￿t. Figure 6 presents
the information in Table 11 by voting game and cost treatment graphically.
Table 11: Group Mean Bene￿ts and Costs Summary*
Actual Optimal (E￿) rE￿
Signal pro￿les E(B) Cost Net E(B) Cost Net
Simultaneous Low
All 30:48 3:66 26:82 39:80 3:65 36:15 :74
3 Sigs. Agree 49:32 3:77 45:55 55:71 2 53:71 :85
2 Sigs. Agree 18:86 3:60 15:26 30:00 4:67 25:33 :60
Simultaneous High
All 23:45 7:71 15:74 30:25 8 22:25 :71
3 Sigs. Agree 35:94 7:87 28:07 55:71 8 47:71 :59
2 Sigs. Agree 13:51 7:59 5:92 10:00 8 2:00 :49
Sequential Low
All 35:44 2:83 32:61 40:2 3:61 36:59 :89
3 Sigs. Agree 54:78 2:44 52:32 55:71 2 53:71 :97
2 Sigs. Agree 22:73 3:09 19:64 30:00 4:67 25:33 :78
Sequential High
All 28:84 9:68 19:16 29:43 8 21:43 :89
3 Sigs. Agree 46:29 8:59 37:70 55:71 8 47:71 :79
2 Sigs. Agree 15:94 10:48 5:46 10:00 8 2:00 2:73
Figure 6 about here
Table 12 presents statistical comparisons. As with informational di⁄erences, we ￿nd
that the net expected bene￿ts are signi￿cantly higher when voting costs are low in both
the simultaneous and sequential voting games. We also ￿nd that net expected bene￿ts
are greater in the sequential voting games compared to the simultaneous ones, although
the di⁄erence is not signi￿cant when voting costs are low and when voting costs are high
and only two signals agree.
29Table 12: Statistical Comparisons of Economic E¢ ciency
Net E(Ben.)
Cases Comparison Di⁄. t statistic
All Cases Low Sim. > High Sim. 11:08 3:40
Low Seq. > High Seq. 13:44 5:78
Low Seq. > Low Sim. 5:76 2:16
High Seq. > High Sim. 3:43 1:15
Low Seq. > High Sim. 16:88 5:99
3 Sigs. Agree Low Sim. > High Sim. 17:48 4:13
Low Seq. > High Seq. 14:64 6:46
Low Seq. > Low Sim. 6:79 2:60
High Seq. > High Sim. 9:63 2:39
Low Seq. > High Sim. 24:27 7:03
2 Sigs. Agree Low Sim. > High Sim. 9:35 2:39
Low Seq. > High Seq. 14:17 4:93
Low Seq. > Low Sim. 4:37 1:34
High Seq. > High Sim. ￿0:46 ￿0:13
Low Seq. > High Sim. 13:71 3:96
V.3 Can Subsidizing Voting Increase Economic E¢ ciency?
Given that cost signi￿cantly reduces payo⁄s for voters, could the increase in payo⁄s from
reducing the cost of voting o⁄set the cost of the subsidy?28 Using the data from the
observed behavior of subjects when the cost of voting is 2, we calculated the net expected
bene￿t from subsidizing those who voted by 6. That e⁄ectively reduced the cost of
voting for those subjects to 2. To compute hypothetical expected payo⁄s with a subsidy,
we assume that the voters from the c = 8 treatment, with a subsidy equal to 6, would vote
with the same probabilities as the voters did in our c = 2 sessions. We compare those
hypothetical average payo⁄s (minus the subsidies) to the average net payo⁄ in the c = 8
committees.
The results from the analysis are presented in Table 13. The results are mixed. When
all three signals agree, subsidizing voting in both the simultaneous and sequential voting
games results in a signi￿cant higher net expected bene￿t in the low cost voting games
than in the high cost games, but the opposite occurs when only two signals agree (an
e⁄ect that is only signi￿cant in the simultaneous voting game) so that for all cases the
28This question is the subject of some recent theoretical work, although in models that are di⁄erent
from ours and focus on simultaneous elections. This literature has obtained mixed results. Borgers
(2004) argues that the number of voters is ine¢ ciently high. Krasa and Polborn (2005), however, show
that in a more general model there are conditions under which the number of voters is ine¢ ciently low
and therefore voting should be subsidized, or ruled mandatory.
30di⁄erence is insigni￿cant.
Table 13: E⁄ect of Subsidizing Voting on Net Expected Bene￿ts
Simultaneous Voting
Cases W/ Subsidy* W/O Subsidy** Di⁄ t statistic
All 16:65 15:73 :92 0:32
3 Sigs. Agree 37:75 28:07 9:67 2:85
2 Sigs. Agree ￿0:11 5:92 ￿6:03 ￿2:09
Sequential Voting
All 20:31 19:16 1:15 0:54
3 Sigs. Agree 44:05 37:70 6:35 2:92
2 Sigs. Agree 2:76 5:46 ￿2:70 ￿1:25
V.4 Summary of E¢ ciency Results
We reach the following conclusions from our analysis of informational and economic e¢ -
ciency:
￿ Neither the simultaneous nor the sequential voting games achieve the benchmark
e¢ ciency level.
￿ Increasing the cost of voting signi￿cantly reduces informational and economic e¢ -
ciency in both the simultaneous and sequential voting games.
￿ When the cost of voting is high, sequential voting provides greater economic e¢ -
ciency.
￿ Subsidizing voting leads to more e¢ cient outcomes in both sequential voting com-
mittees and simultaneous voting committees, but the imporovement is not statisti-
cally signi￿cant.
VI Equity and Voting Order
As noted in the Introduction, Thompson argues that later voters have an unfair advantage
over earlier voters. And as we discussed, St. Bernard Board of Education member Don
Campbell felt he su⁄ered a disadvantage being early in the voting order and that everyone
should take a turn being ￿rst. We have seen that later voters abstain more than earlier
voters, even in the high cost treatment where early voters are theoretically predicted to
abstain strategically. Is sequential voting inequitable? Do later voters earn greater
payo⁄s?
31In Table 14 and Figure 7 we compare the expected mean payo⁄s in sequential voting by
voter position and treatment. We ￿nd that there are signi￿cant di⁄erences between voter
payo⁄s in the sequential voting games, second and third voters make signi￿cantly more
than ￿rst voters in the low and high cost treatments and third voters make signi￿cantly
more than second voters in the low cost treatment. Thus, we ￿nd signi￿cant evidence
that under sequential voting choosing later in the voting order implies higher payo⁄s.
Table 14: Observed inequity in Sequential Voting
Mean Di⁄erences in Net E(B)
Net E(B) Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Avg. Simul.
Low Cost: Voter 1
All Cases ￿:4￿￿￿ ￿:77￿￿￿ 1:54￿
3 Sigs. Agree ￿:64￿￿￿ ￿1:21￿￿￿ 1:65￿
2 Sigs. Agree ￿:24￿￿ ￿:48￿￿￿ 1:22
Low Cost: Voter 2
All Cases :4￿￿￿ ￿:37￿￿￿ 1:94￿￿
3 Sigs. Agree :64￿￿￿ ￿:57￿￿￿ 2:29￿￿
2 Sigs. Agree :24￿￿ ￿:23￿￿ 1:46
Low Cost: Voter 3
All Cases :77￿￿￿ :37￿￿￿ 2:31￿￿￿
3 Sigs. Agree 1:21￿￿￿ :57￿￿￿ 2:86￿￿￿
2 Sigs. Agree :48￿￿￿ :23￿￿ 1:69
High Cost: Voter 1
All Cases ￿1:63￿￿￿ ￿1:9￿￿￿ ￿0:03
3 Sigs. Agree ￿2:24￿￿￿ ￿2:41￿￿￿ 1:66
2 Sigs. Agree ￿1:17￿￿ ￿1:52￿￿￿ ￿1:05
High Cost: Voter 2
All Cases 1:63￿￿￿ ￿:28 1:59
3 Sigs. Agree 2:24￿￿￿ ￿:18 3:90￿￿￿
2 Sigs. Agree 1:17￿￿ ￿:35 0:12
High Cost: Voter 3
All Cases 1:9￿￿￿ :28 1:87
3 Sigs. Agree 2:41￿￿￿ :18 4:07￿￿￿
2 Sigs. Agree 1:52￿￿￿ :35 0:47
***p < :01;**p < :05, *p < :10
Figure 7 about here
As noted above, we found that sequential voting is more economically e¢ cient than
simultaneous voting when voting costs are high. We compare the individual voter net
expected bene￿ts to the average net expected bene￿ts with simultaneous voting in order
to determine if these bene￿ts are distributed equitably. We ￿nd that in both the low and
high cost treatments voters later in the voting order receive signi￿cantly higher payo⁄s,
32particularly when all three signals agree and later sequential voters abstain. In the
high cost treatment, early voters (voter 1￿ s) also earn signi￿cantly higher net expected
bene￿ts, although less so when all three signals agree and less than the additional bene￿ts
gained by later voters (voters 2 and 3), which re￿ ects the bene￿t gain in sequential voting
outcomes over simultaneous voting ones in the high cost case.
Note that the equity issue is also present in the E￿ outcomes, although to a greater
extent in the high cost voting games than in the low cost ones and when not all signals
agree. Table 15 illustrates the distribution of net expected bene￿ts with E￿.
Table 15: Theoretical inequity under E￿
Cases Low Cost Net E(B) High Cost Net E(B)
Voter 1 All 31:4 31:8
3 Sigs. Agree 46:6 40:6
2 Sigs. Agree 38:0 25:3
Voter 2 & 3 All 42:6 39:8
3 Sigs. Agree 48:6 48:6
2 Sigs. Agree 38:7 33:3
Di⁄. All 1:2 8:0
3 Sigs. Agree 2:0 8:0
2 Sigs. Agree 0:7 8:0
VII Concluding Remarks
Many voting situations from the St. Bernard Parish School Board in Louisiana to ref-
erenda on the European Union￿ s Constitution to mass elections in the United States are
not simultaneous. The choices made by earlier voters are often known to those who vote
later in the sequence. Despite popular perception that sequence matters in these voting
situations, there has been little theoretical or empirical study of the e⁄ect of sequence on
voter information and the outcomes of voting. In this paper we provide a theoretical and
experimental examination of the two systems under costly voting. Our theory suggests
that when the cost of voting is low, early voters should participate and later voters should
only participate if their votes are pivotal, i.e. they should strategically abstain when not
pivotal. In contrast, our theory suggests that when the cost of voting is high, we are
likely to observe strategic abstention by early voters as they ￿pass￿the decision on to
later voters.
Our experimental analysis allowed us to directly measure the e⁄ect of sequence on voter
choices, including abstention, controlling for voter preferences and information, which is
di¢ cult using naturally occurring data. Our experimental results support the theoretical
33predictions in general. Not surprisingly, in simultaneous voting abstention increases with
voting costs. However, we found that in simultaneous voting elections abstention is higher
than predicted when costs are low and lower than predicted when costs are high. We
largely found support for our comparative static predictions in sequential voting elections
with some notable exceptions. Voters who have an opportunity to vote early are less likely
to abstain when voting costs are low, however, we see much greater than predicted voting
by early voters when voting costs are high. Similarly, voters who have an opportunity
to vote late abstain strategically when their votes are not pivotal, but also abstain more
than predicted when their votes could be pivotal, for both low and high cost treatments.
Finally, we found very little evidence of information cascades.
We also considered the e¢ ciency of sequential versus simultaneous voting when voting
is costly. We found that the actual e¢ ciencies were signi￿cantly less than the e¢ ciency
benchmark for both sequentail and simultaneous voting and for both high and low voting
costs. This was the case for both informational and economic e¢ ciency. We also found
signi￿cant di⁄erences between the performance of committees across the di⁄erent treat-
ments. Committees with low voting costs fared better than committees with high voting
costs, and committees that voted sequentially fared better than committees that voted
simultaneously. All of these di⁄erence were signi￿cant, except there was no signi￿cant dif-
ference in the performance of high cost sequential committees and high cost simultaneous
committees.
Finally, we evaluated the equity of sequential voting. There are signi￿cant advantages
to later voters in sequential voting, but these gains are at the expense of early voters.
This di⁄erence is greater with with lower voting costs. In contrast, there is no equity
issue with simultaneous voting.
Our results thus yield mixed conclusions about the value of simultaneous versus se-
quential voting, depending on how one weighs e¢ ciency versus equity. The e¢ cient
mechanism is a sequential procedure and sequential voting can lead to more informed
group decision making that is economically more e¢ cient for the group, as well. How-
ever, we ￿nd that in sequential voting there are signi￿cant advantages to voters who are
later in the voting order since they can choose to strategically abstain and in the high
cost treatment, early voters vote more often than predicted.
34VIII Appendix
VIII.1 Example 1
This is an example of a non-neutral perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential game if
the cost of voting is su¢ ciently low. The strategy of voter 1 is ￿ (B;b) = 1 and ￿ (￿;a) = 1.
The strategy of voter 2 on the equilibrium path is: ￿ (￿;b;f￿g) = ￿ (￿;b;fBg) = 1,
￿ (A;a;fBg) = ￿ (A;b;f￿g) = 1. That is, following an abstention by voter 1, voter 2
abstains with an b signal, and votes for A with an a signal. Thus, two abstentions will
signal to voter 3 that the ￿rst two voters received con￿ icting signals. Following a voter for
B by voter 1, voter 2 does exactly the same thing: he abstains with an b signal, and votes
for A with an a signal. O⁄ the equilbrium path, voter 2￿ s strategies are ￿ (￿;a;fAg) = 1
and ￿ (B;b;fAg) = 1 (as in the neutral equilibrium). Notice that in this equilibrium,
voter 1 never votes for A and voter 2 never votes for B.
On the equilibrium path, the strategy of voter 3 is: ￿ (B;b;f￿￿g) = ￿ (A;a;f￿￿g) =
1; ￿ (￿;b;fB￿g) = ￿ (￿;a;fB￿g) = 1, ￿ (A;a;fBAg) = 1; ￿ (B;b;fBAg) = 1. O⁄
the equilibrium path, the strategy for voter 3 is ￿ (￿;a;fBBg) = ￿ (￿;a;fAAg) =
￿ (￿;b;fBBg) = ￿ (￿;b;fAAg) = ￿ (￿;a;fA￿g) = ￿ (￿;b;fAAg) = 1, ￿ (￿;a;f￿Bg) =
￿ (￿;b;f￿Bg) = 1, ￿ (B;b;fABg) = 1, ￿ (A;a;fABg) = 1. That is, voter 3 votes sin-
cerely to break ties and otherwise abstains. Table YY displays the equilibrium voting
decisions and outcomes, for each signal pro￿le.
Table YY: Non-neutral equilibrium
in Sequential Game with Low Cost
Signals Votes Outcome
Voter # Voter #
1 2 3 1 2 3
a a a ￿ A ￿ A
a a b ￿ A ￿ A
a b a ￿ ￿ A A
a b b ￿ ￿ B B
b a a B A A A
b a b B A B B
b b a B ￿ ￿ B
b b b B ￿ ￿ B
￿ (￿;s3;fBBg) = ￿ (￿;s3;fAAg) = 1 for any s3, ￿ (A;s3;fBAg) = 1 for any s3,
￿ (￿;b;fB￿g) = 1, ￿ (A;a;fB￿g) = 1, ￿ (B;s3;fABg) = 1 for any s3, ￿ (￿;a;fA￿g) = 1,
￿ (B;b;fA￿g) = 1, ￿ (B;b;f￿￿g) = ￿ (A;a;f￿￿g) = 1, and ￿ (￿;s3;f￿zg) = 1 for any
signal s3 and any vote z = A;B chosen by vote 2:
35VIII.2 Example 2
This is an example of an equilibrium where the ￿rst agent always votes against his own
signal. The strategy of voter 1 is ￿ (A;b) = ￿ (B;a) = 1. The strategy of player 2 is:
￿ (￿;s2;f￿g) = 1 for any s2 = a;b, ￿ (A;a;fBg) = 1, ￿ (￿;b;fBg) = 1, ￿ (B;b;fAg) = 1,
￿ (￿;a;fAg) = 1. And the strategy of agent 3 is: ￿ (￿;s3;fBBg) = ￿ (￿;s3;fAAg) =
1 for any s3, ￿ (A;s3;fBAg) = 1 for any s3, ￿ (￿;b;fB￿g) = 1, ￿ (A;a;fB￿g) = 1,
￿ (B;s3;fABg) = 1 for any s3, ￿ (￿;a;fA￿g) = 1, ￿ (B;b;fA￿g) = 1, ￿ (B;b;f￿￿g) =
￿ (A;a;f￿￿g) = 1, and ￿ (￿;s3;f￿zg) = 1 for any signal s3 and any vote z = A;B chosen
by vote 2: This strategy pro￿le is a neutral perfect Bayesian equilibrium if c < p2(1￿p)v.
To see this, ￿rst note that it is trivially veri￿ed that the strategy used by voters 3 and
2 are always optimal, given voter 1￿ s strategy. Consider now the ￿rst voter, assuming
that he observed an a signal (the case for a b signal is symmetric and omitted). Table
(3) presents the outcome that is induced by voter￿ s 1 as a function of the realization of
signals of agents 2 and 3 (labelled "state").
Action
State
Vote A Vote B Abstain First Best
aaa A A A A
aab 1
2A; 1




abb B B B B
(3)
Form (3) it can be seen that Vote A is dominated by Vote B: in both case a cost c must
be paid, and Vote B induces a better outcome in all possible states. We only need to
verify that the voter prefers to vote B than to abstain. The two actions induce the same







v ￿ c =
1
2
p(1 ￿ p)(2p ￿ 1)v ￿ c (4)
Where Pr(Ajaba) is the probability that the state is A given a realization fabag and
p(1 ￿ p) is the probability that the state is fabag given that voter 1 observes an a signal
(which is equal to the probability that the state is fabag). From (4) it follows that voting
against his own signal is optimal for voter 1 if p2(1 ￿ p)v > c. ￿
VIII.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider now the ￿rst case in which ￿ 2 [2p(1 ￿ p);1]. We proceed in three steps:
Step 1. Consider ￿rst voter 3 and assume, without loss of generality, that he has observed
signal a. Only three cases are possible. If no other voter has voted, or if the number of
36voters who voted A is equal to the number of voters who voted for B, then his posterior
probability that the state is A would be p. The net bene￿t of voting in this case is
(1 ￿ ￿) 1
2(2p ￿ 1) > 0: so he would vote informatively. The second case is when A has
received exactly one vote more than the other (histories ￿A and A￿). In this case, the
posterior belief that the state is A is larger than p, and he would like A to win; however
he does not need to vote to obtain this outcome, so he abstains. If, on the contrary, B
has received one vote more than A from previous voters, then we have two distinct cases.
In history ￿B, he believes that A and B have received the same number of signals. In
this case, his posterior that the state is 1
2: the voter is indi⁄erent between the options
and would not vote (given that voting is costly). After history B￿, he believes that B
has received two votes, so he prefers alternative B and he abstains. Finally, it is possible
that one alternative has received more than one vote more that the other: in this case
voter n abstains because he would not a⁄ect the outcome.
Step 2. Consider now voter 2. We can distinguish two di⁄erent cases. Assume ￿rst
that voter 1 has not voted before. If voter 2 votes, then, by step 1, he knows that voter
3 would abstain: his expected utility would be (1 ￿ ￿) 1
2(2p ￿ 1)v. If he abstains, then
voter 3 would vote informatively, and his expected utility would be 1
2(2p￿1)v: so he ￿nds
it optimal to abstain. Assume now that voter 1 has voted A. If voter 2 has observed
signal a, then he would ￿nd it strictly optimal to abstain: in this case by voting A would
not a⁄ect the outcome and by voting for B he would reduce the expected payo⁄. Assume
that voter 2 has observed signal b. If he does not vote, then 3 would not vote as well
and A would win: his expected utility would be 1
2v (his posterior is 1/2 in this case).
Clearly voting for A is suboptimal, so consider the other alternative in which he votes for
B. In this case, by step 1, voter 3 would vote informatively and decide the outcome of
the election; and the net expected payo⁄ would be pv ￿ c. The net bene￿t of voting is
therefore (1 ￿ ￿) 1
2(2p ￿ 1)v > 0, so voter 2 ￿nds it optimal to vote informatively for B.
Step 3. Finally consider voter 1. If he abstains, then voter 2 would abstain. Voter
3 would vote informatively and determine the election: in this case the expected payo⁄
would be pv. If he votes informatively, then he obtains:






The net bene￿t of voting is therefore:
h





If ￿ > 2p(1 ￿ p), voter 1 abstains and the election is decided by the last voter.
37Consider now the second case in which ￿ 2 [0;2p(1 ￿ p)]: Assume that 2 and 3 follow
exactly the same strategies as in i), but 1 voters informatively. From steps 1-3, this
strategy is and equilibrium when ￿ ￿ 2p(1 ￿ p). The result stated in Proposition 1
follows immediately remembering that ￿ = c[(2p ￿ 1)v]
￿1. ￿
VIII.4 Sequential Voting Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. This is an experiment in group
decision making. During the experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention
and ask that you follow instructions carefully. Please turn o⁄ your cell phones. Do not
open other applications on your computer, chat with other students, or engage in other
distracting activities, such as reading books, doing homework, etc. You will be paid
for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment. Di⁄erent participants may
earn di⁄erent amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the
decisions of others, and partly on chance. The entire experiment will take place through
computer terminals, except for the rolling of a die by an individual who will act as a
￿ monitor￿for the experiment. It is important that you not talk or in any way try to
communicate with other participants during the experiments.
The experiment you are participating in is a group decision making experiment, where
you will be making decisions in small committees. We will start with a brief instruction
period. During the instruction period, you will be given a complete description of the
experiment and will be shown how to use the computers. If you have any questions
during the instruction period, please raise your hand and your question will be answered
out loud so everyone can hear. If you have any questions after the experiment has begun,
raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you. After the Instructions,
there will be a practice session. You will not be paid for the matches in the practice
session. The practice session will be followed by the paid session. At the end of the
paid session, you will be paid the sum of what you have earned, plus a show-up fee of
$10.00. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how
much you earned. Your earnings during the experiment are denominated in FRANCS.
Your DOLLAR earnings are determined by multiplying your earnings in FRANCS by
a conversion rate. For this experiment the conversion rate is 0.01, meaning that 100
FRANCS equal 1 DOLLAR. The computer keeps a record of the payments, but you are
also asked to keep track of your earnings on a record sheet that we will provide in a few
minutes.
This experiment will consist of two parts. For the entire experiment, there will be a
monitor, who will be randomly chosen from one of the student participants. The monitor
38will assist in running the experiment by rolling a die and generating random numbers
for use in the experiment and will be paid a ￿xed amount ($20.00) for the experiment.
We will now roll a multi-sided die to pick the monitor. The student at the desk number
that shows up will be the monitor. [20-SIDED DIE IS ROLLED] The monitor is the
participant who is seated in front of computer #XX. Please go to Comp no. 19. Please
continue to pay attention to the Instructions as they are also relevant to you. If you
have any questions, please ask. If you should have questions once the experiment has
started, please ask the person sitting next to you at Comp. 19. We will now begin a brief
instruction period followed by a Practice session. You will not be paid for the practice
session.
This experiment comprises 2 parts. The ￿rst part of the experiment will take place
over a sequence of 20 matches. We begin the ￿rst match by dividing you into ? committees
of three members each. Each of you is assigned to exactly one of these committees. You
are not told the identity of the other members of your committee.
Your committee can make one of two decisions. The decision is simply to make a choice
between one of two ￿jars￿ , Jar 1 or Jar 2. At the beginning of the match, the monitor
secretly rolls a 6-sided die to determine which of the two jars is the correct jar for your
committee, and enters this information into the master computer. If your committee
chooses the correct jar, everyone in your committee receives a high payo⁄ equal to 50
francs. If your committee chooses the incorrect jar, everyone in the committee receives a
low payo⁄ equal to 10 francs. If the die rolled by the monitor comes up 1, 2 or 3, then
Jar 1 would be the correct decision for the committee to make; if the die comes up 4, 5
or 6, Jar 2 would be the correct decision; but you are not told which jar is the correct
decision until after all the members in your committee have voted. Before voting, each of
you will receive a piece of information about which is the correct jar.
The committee decides in a sequential procedure. First, the computer randomly as-
signs an order in which the members of your committee either vote or abstain. Each
member of your committee either votes or abstains when prompted by the computer.
He/she can vote for one of the two jars or, to Abstain i.e., not vote for either decision.
Voting is costly. Any member who decides to vote, must pay a cost of 8 francs, regardless
of the outcome. This cost is automatically subtracted from earnings.
Your committee￿ s decision is made by plurality rule. Whichever jar receives more votes
from your committee￿ s members is your committee￿ s decision. Ties (0-0 or 1-1) are broken
randomly. After everyone in your committee has made their decisions to either vote or
abstain, the group decision and the correct jar is revealed to you. If your committee￿ s
group decision is equal to the Correct jar, each member of your committee earns 50 francs.
If your committee￿ s group decision is incorrect, each member of your committee earns 10
39francs. Of course, voters must also pay their voting cost. So a voter￿ s net payo⁄ is
50-8=42 for a corrrect decision; a voter￿ s net payo⁄ for an incorrect decision is 10-8=2
The table in front of the room fully describes all the possible payo⁄s. [Experimenter
go over table.] The other committees in the room face similar tasks, but the correct
decision may be di⁄erent for di⁄erent committees. The monitor rolls the die separately
for each committee. Remember that committees are completely independent, and they
act independently.
After the ￿rst match is completed, we proceed to the second match. In the second
match, you are all reassigned randomly and anonymously into new 3-person committees,
and the process repeats itself for the new committees. The monitor rolls the die again for
each committee to determine that committee￿ s correct decision, each committee member
again receives a new piece of information and the sequential procedure is carried out as
in the ￿rst match, but possibly in a di⁄erent order. This will continue for a total of 20
matches. After 20 matches, we will begin Part 2 of the experiment. We will read you the
instructions for Part 2 after we complete Part 1. From now on the experiment will take
place through computer terminals only, except for the roll of the die performed by the
monitor. I will now hand out Record Sheets on which you will be asked to record certain
information as the experiment proceeds.
We will now begin the Practice session and go through two practice matches. During
the practice matches, please do not hit any keys until you are asked to, and when have
to enter information, please do exactly as asked. At the end of the second practice match
there will be a short comprehension quiz. If you have any questions during the quiz, please
raise your hand. You must answer all the questions in the quiz before the experiment can
begin. Again, you are not paid for these 2 practice matches.
[AUTHENTICATE CLIENTS]
Please double click on the tree icon on your desktop that says j-s. When the computer
prompts you for your name, type your First and Last name. Then click SUBMIT and
wait for further instructions.
[START GAME]
[SCREEN 2 ]
You now see the ￿rst screen of the experiment on your computer. It should look similar
to this screen. Please note that the screen exhibited up front is not exactly identical to any
of the screens exhibited on your computers at this time. It only serves as an illustration
and is not meant to be suggestive. At the top left of the screen, you see your subject ID.
Please record that on your record sheet now. You have been assigned by the computer to
a group of 3 subjects. This committee assignment will change after each match. Within
your committee, the computer has randomly assigned an order in which the members of
40the committee vote. You are told your position in the order, i.e. whether you vote or
abstain either ￿rst, second or third, in your committee. Your position in the decision
making order is displayed on your screen here (POINT).
The random order of moves is determined by the computer independently for each
committee and in each match. Note this is what the screen looks like for the person who
is ￿rst in the decision making order.
(POINT to ￿Order of Moves￿ , with laser.)
Suppose you are the person who is either second or third in the order. Then the screen
would look like this:
[SCREEN 3 ]
On the upper right of your screen are pictures of the two jars, each containing exactly
8 balls. Jar 1 is on the left and contains 6 Red balls and 2 Blue balls. Jar 2 is on
the right and contains 2 Red balls, and 6 Blue balls. The monitor will now roll a die,
to assign one of the two jars to each committee and will enter this information into
the computer. The assigned Jar for a committee represents that committee￿ s correct
decision. The die is rolled separately for each committee. You will not be told which Jar
was assigned to your committee until everyone in your committee has chosen to vote or
Abstain. However, before you choose to vote or abstain, each of you is allowed to see a
small piece of information about which jar was assigned to your group. Please wait... we
will explain this shortly.
You should also note that the window in the mid-left of the screen exhibits how
your payo⁄s are determined. [POINT TO MID-LEFT PAYOFF TABLE]. It shows how
the actual jar and your committees￿choice combine to determine your payo⁄. If your
committee￿ s decision matches the committee￿ s actual Jar, you earn 50 francs for the
match and you earn 10 if the group decision does not match the actual Jar. In addition
to this, 8 francs are subtracted from your payo⁄ if you vote during that match.
[SHOW SCREEN 4 ]
Once the monitor has assigned the jar for your committee, you see this screen. You
now see only your committee￿ s jar on your screen, but the colors of the balls are hidden.
(Emphasize and repeat later)Please note that the balls have been randomly shu› ed
on each of your screens by the computer so there is no way to guess which color ball is
in which location and you cannot tell which Jar was assigned to your committee. The
random shu› ing is di⁄erent for each of member.
You will now be allowed to see the color of exactly one of the balls in your committee￿ s
jar. To do so, now please use the mouse to move your cursor to whichever ball you want
to look at and click once. We call this ball ￿your sample￿ . It is your piece of private
information. The other members of your committee are also choosing balls in a similar
41way, although the order of their balls is also randomly determined, so it will generally be
di⁄erent. Therefore, it is possible for di⁄erent members of the same committee to click
on di⁄erent color balls even from the same jar. The colors of all the other balls remain
hidden until the end of the match. Please record the color of your sample on your record
sheet (R for red or B for blue). Please wait for further instructions.
[SCREEN 5 ] (Showing screen of ￿rst mover)
Now, I will explain the sequential procedure. Please pay close attention to the screen
here and the instructions. You will make your individual decisions to vote or abstain in
the order that is displayed on your screen. You will be prompted to vote when it is your
turn. You will be shown how the previous members voted or abstained before you choose.
The person in your committee, who is ￿rst in the ￿ order of moves￿moves ￿rst. This is
what his/her screen looks like.
[SCREEN 6]
Next, the person who was second in the order of moves sees the following screen.
Note that the second person is shown the ￿rst person￿ s decision, here. (POINT). In this
example, the ￿rst person voted for Jar 1 and the second person can see this here.
[SCREEN 7]
Finally, the third person sees a screen like this. The third person can see what both
of the other two members of his committee did, in this panel here (POINT).
In this example, the ￿rst person voted for Jar 1 and the second person abstained. Now
it is the third person￿ s turn to vote or abstain.
[SCREEN 8]
Once everyone has voted, the results for the committee are displayed on a screen like
this. In this example, the ￿rst person voted for Jar 1, the second person abstained and
the third person voted for Jar 2. So there was 1 votes for Jar 1 and 1 vote for Jar 2. The
committee decision was therefore a tie. Because it was a tie, the computer randomly broke
the tie. In this case, they broke the tie for Jar 1, which was the correct jar. Therefore
the payo⁄s were (show). Please remember that this is just an example to illustrate, and
is not intended to be suggestive.
This ￿nal screen also displays other pieces of information. If you look at the top left
corner, it indicates what the actual jar was, and your committee decision. The table with
columns in the bottom of your screen is the History panel and summarizes important
information. (AS YOU READ, POINT TO RELEVANT COLUMNS) COLUMN ONE
indicates the match number, COLUMN TWO indicates your sample color, COLUMN
THREE shows your vote, COLUMN four provides a summary of the votes: (Jar1-Jar2-
Abstention), COLUMN FIVE shows your committee￿ s decision, COLUMN SIX shows the
what the actual jar was, and COLUMN SEVEN shows your earnings (which are not listed
42here because this was a practice session).
Now, please make sure you have recorded all the information for this practice match
on your record sheet. (Please remember the following important things) The committee
decision is made by plurality rule. Whichever jar receives more votes is the committee de-
cision, with ties broken randomly. For example, if everyone on your committee abstained,
it would be a 0-0 tie, and 1
2 the time the computer would make the group decision Jar 1
and half the time Jar 2. Committee decisions are summarized in the text in the upper
left panel of your screen (POINT), and are also summarized in the history screen at the
bottom in column ￿ve (POINT). As the experiment proceeds the history screen will show
the outcomes of all previous committees you were in.
Remember that you earn 50 francs for the match if your committee￿ s decision matches
the committee￿ s actual Jar, and you earn 10 if the group decision does not match the
actual Jar. Furthermore, you must pay of voting cost of 8 francs if you chose to vote,
which is subtracted from your earnings. This information is also displayed on the screen
(POINT to mid-left table). Also, please note that at the end of the match the colors of
all the other balls in your jar are revealed to you. This marks the end of the match.
[SCREEN 9: Instructions Part 1]
For the next match you will be randomly re-matched into another committee with
di⁄erent subjects. A new Jar will be assigned to your committee by the monitor in the
same way as before. That is, there is a 50/50 chance that your new committee￿ s Jar is Jar
1 or Jar 2. Just as before, you will get a sample from this Jar by clicking on a ball to reveal
its color. Then we will have the voting stage and a group decision will be determined.
At the end of the next match, you will be asked to take a short comprehension quiz.
Everyone must answer all the questions correctly before we go to the paid matches. Also,
during the quiz, you must answer all the questions on Page 1 of the quiz to proceed to
Page 2 and so on. If you answer a question incorrectly, you will be asked to correct it.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions during the quiz, and we will come to
your desk and answer your question in private.
[START MATCH 1]
Please proceed through the steps of match 2 at your own pace. . . . Practice match
2 is now over.
Are there any questions before we begin with the paid session? We will now begin
with the 20 paid matches of Part 1. Please pull out your dividers for the paid session
of the experiment. If there are any problems or questions from this point on, raise your
hand and an experimenter will come and assist you.
[START MATCH 1 ] [ AFTER MATCH 21 STOP.]
[After MATCH 21] We have now reached the end of Part 1.
43We will now begin Part 2 of the experiment. Part 2 is exactly the same as Part 1
except that the COST of VOTING is now 2 Francs. There will be 20 matches in Part 2.
Please go ahead and begin Part 2.
[ SCREEN 10: Instruction Part 2]
Part 2
[After MATCH 41] This marks the end of Part 2 and the experiment. Your Total
Payo⁄ is displayed on your screen. Please record this payo⁄ on your record sheet. Your
total payo⁄ is your payo⁄ from both parts plus the show-up fee of $10. We will pay each
of you in private in the next room in the order of your arrival, beginning with the Monitor.
Please make sure you have ￿lled out the third page of the record sheet and sign it and
turn it when you receive payment. You are under no obligation to reveal your earnings
to the other players.
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